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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The point of departure for this symposium1 was the asserted conflict 
between (1) “the principles and practice of open science” and (2) “laws and 
policies that restrict access to results and ideas,” whether for reasons of 
individual privacy, national security, or the economic benefits derived from 
information.2  The symposium proposal placed special emphasis on 
circumstances in either the regulatory or judicial arenas in which access to 
information relevant to protecting public health or safety may be restricted in 
order to prevent “financial harm to private parties.”3 
This article represents the perspective of the chemical industry on these 
issues.4  For reasons of space and time, it focuses primarily on the regulatory 
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 1. The symposium was sponsored by the Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy 
(SKAPP), based at the George Washington University School of Public Health and Health Science.  
The articles are derived from papers presented at SKAPP’s 2004 Coronado Conference II: 
“Sequestered Science: The Consequences of Undisclosed Knowledge.”  See Project on Scientific 
Knowledge and Public Policy, Coronado Conference Papers,  http://www.defendingscience.org/ 
coronado_conference_papers/Coronado-Conference-Papers.cfm (last visited June 6, 2006) (providing 
information about SKAPP and the Coronado conferences, and promising to publish forthcoming 
papers from the conference online); see also discussion infra Part IV.  This article was solicited after the 
conference. 
 2. David Michaels and Neil Vidmar, Sequestered Science: The Consequences of Undisclosed 
Knowledge (Oct. 19, 2004) (unpublished symposium proposal, on file with Law & Contemporary 
Problems). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Another article in this issue conveys the perspective of the pharmaceutical industry in the 
regulatory setting, so this article does not discuss that aspect.  See Scott M. Lassman, Transparency and 
Innuendo: An Alternative to Reactive Over-Disclosure, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69 (Summer 2006). 
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system.  In short, it contends that this symposium’s premise—that economic 
considerations result in concealment by industry of health or safety data—is 
faulty, especially as regards toxicological data on health or the environment in 
the regulatory arena. 
Part II of the article addresses when and how access to health effects 
information may be affected by financial interests.  (It does not consider 
individual privacy or national security because far less conflict is apparent in 
those cases.)5  Part II begins by discussing the numerous federal laws that (1) 
require information regarding the hazards of chemicals to be reported to the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or otherwise to be made public, 
or (2) enable EPA to gather or require the creation of this information.  These 
laws generally do not allow public access to the information to be restricted 
based on commercial considerations.  Other federal statutes create significant 
disincentives to nondisclosure, as do the potentially ruinous consequences of 
civil liability.  In addition, the chemical industry is voluntarily generating and 
releasing an enormous volume of information relevant to chemical risk 
assessment—both chemical-specific hazard data and more general 
methodological research. 
Part III argues that no qualitative distinction can be drawn between the 
financial and other incentives that might affect disclosure by for-profit entities 
and the incentives that might affect disclosure by other entities that may 
conduct, sponsor, or opine on scientific research. 
Turning briefly to the judicial arena, Part IV explores some of the 
implications for open (and meritorious) science arising from lawyers’ being not 
only advocates, but also for-profit entities. 
II 
THE GREAT EXTENT TO WHICH CHEMICAL HAZARD INFORMATION IS 
ALREADY PUBLIC 
Numerous mechanisms already exist to ensure the disclosure of information 
about chemical hazards to the public: Some federal laws drive the disclosure of 
information regarding hazards that chemicals may pose to health or the 
environment.  Other federal laws and the tort law system create substantial 
liabilities for entities that conceal chemical hazard information.  And several 
major voluntary initiatives of the global chemical industry are making vast 
quantities of information about chemicals available to the public. 
 
 5. The author is unaware of controversy over restrictions on access to health or safety information 
premised on privacy reasons.  Some debate has emerged about whether and how the government might 
use concepts like “for official use only” and “sensitive but unclassified” to restrict access to 
government-funded research.  See Leslie Jacobs, A Troubling Equation in Contracts for Government 
Funded Scientific Research: “Sensitive But Unclassified” = Secret But Unconstitutional, 1 J. NAT’L 
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 113, 113–17 (2005) (discussing how secrecy clauses and government-contracted 
research by private scientists connect to influence the content and flow of scientific information, and 
under what circumstances the use of such clauses is constitutional in view of the First Amendment). 
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A. Federal Statutes Requiring Disclosure 
1. The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)6 
a. The TSCA regulatory regime.  Any discussion of chemical hazard 
regulation must begin with TSCA, which comprehensively governs the subject.7  
Section 5 of TSCA requires manufacturers and importers to notify EPA8 prior 
to bringing any newly developed chemicals to market.9  Such a “premanufacture 
notice” (PMN) must include available test data on the chemical.10  Under 
section 4 of TSCA, EPA has broad power to issue rules ordering persons 
manufacturing, processing, or importing a chemical to conduct further tests 
regarding the chemical’s effects on health or the environment whenever EPA 
has insufficient data to determine or predict those effects and certain risk or 
exposure criteria are met.11  EPA frequently works out enforceable consent 
agreements with these parties to perform such tests. 
For any test that EPA requires, or for test results to be considered as part of 
a voluntary submission to EPA, the tests must be conducted following EPA 
guidelines for test protocols designed or approved by EPA to ensure that those 
results will provide reproducible, reliable, and relevant information suitable for 
regulatory decisionmaking.12  These protocols are part of the EPA Good 
Laboratory Practice Standards (GLP Standards), which, among other things, 
 
 6. 15 U.S.C. § § 2601–2692 (2000). 
 7. See id.  “[TSCA] covers all chemicals planned for production, manufactured in, imported to, or 
exported from the United States.”  U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, OVERVIEW: OFFICE OF 
POLLUTION PREVENTION AND TOXICS PROGRAMS 2 (Draft Version 2.0, 2003), http://www.epa.gov/ 
opptintr/oppt101c2.pdf [hereinafter EPA OVERVIEW].  The only “[s]ubstances not covered under 
TSCA are pesticides; tobacco (or tobacco products); firearms and ammunition; source material by-
products or special nuclear material defined by the Atomic Energy Act; and food, food additives, drugs, 
or cosmetics covered under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.”  Id. at 2 n.3. 
 8. The EPA program office tasked with implementing TSCA is called the Office of Pollution, 
Prevention and Toxics, sometimes referred to as “OPPT.”  EPA OVERVIEW, supra note 7, at 1.  For 
simplicity, this article refers to EPA as a whole. 
 9. 15 U.S.C § 2604(a).  “When TSCA was passed in 1976, it was not known how many chemicals 
were in commerce in the U.S., in what quantities or where they were produced and/or imported.”  EPA 
OVERVIEW, supra note 7, at 2.  TSCA therefore required persons manufacturing, importing or 
processing chemicals to notify EPA.  Id. at 5.  This resulted in the initial TSCA Chemical Substance 
Inventory of “existing” chemicals in 1979.  Id. at 5–6.  As persons notify EPA of “new” chemicals they 
propose to manufacture or import, these are added to the inventory.  Id. 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(d)(1).  “Test data” is defined broadly to include data that is “related to the 
effect of any manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of such substance or 
any article containing such substance, or of any combination of such activities, on health of the 
environment.”  Id. § 2604(d)(1)(B).  As a result of the PMN requirement, EPA has reviewed every new 
chemical prior to its commercialization, or a total of about 36,600 PMNs from 1979 through 2003.  EPA 
OVERVIEW, supra note 7, at 8–10.  Only about half of such new chemicals were ever commercialized.  
Id. at 11.  About ten percent of PMNs reviewed between 1979 through 2003 have resulted in EPA 
requiring testing or submission of additional information, agreements by companies to limit the uses of 
production volume of a chemical, restrictions on uses of a chemical, or withdrawal of the submission.  
Id. at 9–11. 
 11. Id. § 2603(a). 
 12. See 40 C.F.R. § 792.120 (2004) (listing fifteen nonexclusive guidelines and requiring that any 
variation from the guidelines be documented and explained). 
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require that EPA have access to complete, quality-assured data sets 
documenting that experimenters (1) adhered to the experimental protocol 
employed, (2) took all of the steps and measurements claimed to have been 
taken during the study, and (3) accurately reported the test results.13 
Beyond tests that EPA may require, TSCA section 8(d) authorizes EPA to 
compel, by rule, manufacturers and importers of a given chemical to submit lists 
and copies of unpublished health and safety studies for the chemical.14  Such 
reporting can be required of any company that made or imported the chemical 
in the ten years before the effective date of the EPA rule15 and extends for a 
period of sixty days following publication of the rule.16 
Since TSCA was enacted in 1976, EPA has used its legislative authority to 
require (1) testing on approximately two hundred chemicals, (2) reporting of 
specific information for approximately eleven hundred chemicals, and (3) 
submission of health and safety studies for approximately one thousand 
chemicals.  These mandates have resulted in “more than 50,000 studies covering 
a broad range of health and ecological endpoints.”17  These information 
collection activities continue: in early 2005, EPA announced plans to issue rules 
requiring health effects data for high production volume chemicals not 
“adopted” as part of the High Production Volume Challenge Program, which is 
discussed below.18 
Finally, TSCA includes two important provisions regarding observed 
adverse effects in humans or the environment.  First, TSCA section 8(c) 
requires persons manufacturing, importing, processing, or distributing a 
 
 13. Id.  Part 792.  See also William L. Anderson et al., Daubert’s Backwash: Litigation-Generated 
Science, 34 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 619, 632–33, 675 (2001) (noting that “[GLP Standards] offer 
evidence that the study was rigorously conducted” for both regulatory review and purposes of 
litigation).  Anderson et al. wrote: 
Laboratories performing work for regulatory purposes . . . are required to conform to strict 
laboratory protocols . . . .  The regulators will reject studies that do not meet these criteria . . . .  
Because of the financial implications of poorly documented studies, company laboratories are 
generally careful about the [Good Laboratory Practice] quality of their work. 
Id. at 632–33. 
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 2607(d). 
 15. 40 C.F.R. § 716.5(a)(1) (2004). 
 16. 40 C.F.R. § 716.65 (2004).  The reporting period after the rule is published may be extended, 
but in no event may it exceed two years.  Id.  See also 40 C.F.R. § 716.120 (2004) (listing chemicals for 
which reporting is required, including the effective date of such requirement). 
 17. EPA OVERVIEW, supra note 7, at 17.  To put these numbers into context, only 9000 organic 
chemicals were reported as being produced or imported in annual quantities of 10,000 pounds or more 
when the TSCA inventory of chemicals was updated in 2002.  Id. at 14 n.9; see also U.S. Envtl. 
Protection Agency, Inventory Update Rule, http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/iur/tools/iur02/index.htm (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2006) (providing certain information on chemicals updated every two years).  EPA 
estimates that today there could be as many as 6000 additional chemicals currently in commerce, a 
figure that presumably includes inorganic chemicals and chemicals produced or imported in quantities 
less than 10,000 pounds.  EPA OVERVIEW, supra note 7, at 14 n.9. 
 18. See discussion infra Part II.C.1; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, POLICY 
REGARDING ACCEPTANCE OF NEW COMMITMENTS TO THE HIGH PRODUCTION VOLUME (HPV) 
CHALLENGE PROGRAM 1–3 (June 2005), http://www.epa.gov/chemrtk/hpvpolcy.pdf (providing an 
overview of the program). 
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chemical to maintain records of significant adverse reactions for five years 
(thirty years, in the case of reactions among employees) and to make this 
information available to EPA upon request.19  Second, TSCA section 8(e) 
requires the same persons to “immediately inform” EPA of any “information 
which reasonably supports the conclusion that [a chemical] presents a 
substantial risk of injury to health or the environment,” unless the person has 
“actual knowledge that [EPA] has been adequately informed of such 
information.”20 
Section 8(e) has generated a tremendous volume of reporting.  Since 1977, 
when such reporting began, EPA has received over 15,500 section 8(e) 
submissions, not including any follow-up information requested.21  Although 
questionable in the view of many, the recent high-profile EPA administrative 
enforcement case against DuPont regarding a chemical used in manufacturing 
the nonstick surface Teflon® has certainly generated renewed attention to 
section 8(e) requirements.22  Law firms have warned clients that additional 
section 8(e) enforcement cases may be initiated,23 and the convening of a grand 
jury to examine possible criminal violations in the DuPont case—an even more 
dubious claim—has also attracted wide attention.24 
 
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 2607(c) (2000).  Records to be maintained include “records of consumer allegations 
of personal injury or harm to health, reports of occupational disease or injury, and reports or 
complaints of injury to the environment submitted to the manufacturer, processor, or distributor in 
commerce from any source.”  Id. 
 20. Id. § 2607(e). 
 21. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Substantial Risk Information: TSCA Section 8(e), 
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/itc/pubs/sect8e.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).  Section 8(e) submissions are 
publicly available at U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Chemical Testing Overview, 
http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/chemtest/view.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2006). 
 22. EPA alleged that in 1981 DuPont failed to report the results of a blood test showing that trace 
amounts of perfluorooctanoic acid from drinking water may cross from a mother’s blood through the 
placenta to a fetus.  Answer and Request for Hearing at 1-3, In re Matter of E.I. du Pont de Nemours 
and Co., Nos. TSCA-HQ-2004-0016, RCRA-HQ-2004-0016 (filed Aug. 11, 2004), available at 
http://www2.dupont.com/PFOA/en_US/pdf/answer_and_request_for_hearing.pdf.  DuPont and others 
believe that this information, in and of itself, does not demonstrate a “substantial risk.”  See Press 
Release, I.E. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Dupont Responds to EPA Complaint on Alleged PFOA 
Reporting Violations, (Aug. 12, 2004), http://www.dupont.com/ (follow “Media Center” hyperlink; 
follow “News Releases” hyperlink; then follow “2005 Archives” hyperlink)(explaining the company 
response to three EPA claims).  For the resolution of this administrative case via settlement, see 
generally Juliet Eilperin, DuPont, EPA Settle Chemical Complaint, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 15, 2005, 
at D3 (reporting DuPont paid a multimillion dollar administrative penalty without any admission that it 
deliberately withheld information from EPA). 
 23. See, e.g., Latham & Watkins Env’t, Land and Resources Dep’t, EPA Steps Up Enforcement of 
TSCA Section 8(e) “Substantial Risk” Reporting Requirements, CLIENT ALERT 3,  Apr. 11, 2005, 
http://www.lw.com/resource/Publications/_pdf/pub1236_1.pdf (last visited Apr, 17 2006) (suggesting 
that advances making it more feasible to collect biomonitoring data, such as measuring trace amounts 
of chemicals in the human body, will raise additional questions about when TSCA section 8(e) 
reporting obligations arise). 
 24. Press release, I.E. du Pont de Nemours and Co., DuPont Receives Department of Justice 
Subpoena for Information on PFOA (May 19, 2005), http://www.dupont.com/ (follow “Media Center” 
hyperlink; follow “News Releases” hyperlink; then follow “2005 Archives” hyperlink).  The company 
announced that the Environmental Crimes Section of the Environment and Natural Resources 
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice served the company with a grand jury subpoena from the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in connection with three named chemicals.  Id.  Given 
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There is inherent uncertainty about exactly what the phrase “substantial risk 
of injury to health or the environment” means in any given context, especially 
in the case of environmental data.25  Given the substantial penalties for 
noncompliance, it is likely that the ambiguity of the requirement has actually 
encouraged over-reporting.  Equally important, the difficulty experienced by 
EPA and companies in determining what constitutes a reportable “substantial 
risk of injury to health” illustrates the profound challenge of attempting to put 
into narrative form a single, agreed-upon standard for when health effects or 
other risk data are so significant that EPA should be made aware of it.  Any 
alternative formulation is bound to face the same challenge.  In fact, as the 
DuPont case shows, a summary and general standard such as that in section 
8(e) has the virtue—or vice, depending upon one’s perspective—of sliding 
readily to become a very low threshold for disclosure. 
b. Public disclosure under TSCA.  As can be seen, EPA’s 
implementation of TSCA has resulted in the submission of huge amounts of 
chemical hazard information to EPA.  TSCA does not provide business 
confidentiality protection to health and safety studies of any chemical that has 
been offered for commercial distribution and that is the subject of a PMN or a 4 
test rule, nor to any data reported to or otherwise obtained by EPA regarding 
such a chemical.26  The phrase “health and safety study,” moreover, is expressly 
defined “broadly” in corresponding EPA regulations, which further inhibits 
confidentiality claims.27 
Under some circumstances, TSCA does allow submissions of other 
information, such as precise production volume, producer identity, and 
chemical uses, to be claimed confidential for legitimate reasons.28  However, 
 
the uncertainty regarding whether the facts in this case presented a “substantial risk,” it seems a stretch 
to argue that DuPont knowingly failed to report a substantial risk. 
 25. Questions regarding what is reportable under section 8(e) led EPA to initiate a one-time, 
voluntary Compliance Audit Program (CAP) under which companies could submit information that 
arguably should previously have been submitted under section 8(e) and pay stipulated penalties of up 
to $1,000,000.  See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Registration and Agreement for TSCA Section 8(e) 
Compliance Audit Program, 56 Fed. Reg. 4128 (Feb. 1, 1991).  EPA spent from 1991 to 2003 
reconsidering what sorts of environmental data were reportable under section 8(e).  See U.S. Envtl. 
Protection Agency, Notice: Registration and Agreement for TSCA Section 8(e) Compliance Audit 
Program Modification, 56 Fed. Reg. 28458, 28459 (June 20, 1991) (extending the time to file under the 
CAP and providing for further clarification of reporting environmental data under section 8(e)); U.S. 
Envtl. Protection Agency, Notice: TSCA Section 8(e); Notification of Substantial Risk; Policy 
Clarification and Reporting Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. 33129, 33130 (June 2, 2003) (revising and clarifying 
provisions of the TSCA section 8(e) policy statement issued in 1978; all guidance is now in the current 
document, obviating the need to refer back to older documents). 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 2613(b)(1)(2000). 
 27. See 40 C.F.R. § 716.3 (2004) (defining “health and safety study” and providing applicable 
examples).  In particular, “[a]ny data that bear on the effects of a chemical substance on health or the 
environment would be included.  Chemical identity is part of, or underlying data to, a health and safety 
study.”  Id. § 716.3(1).  EPA PMN rules use a different but comparable definition.  See 40 C.F.R. § 
720.3(k) (2004). 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 2613(a)–(b) (2000).  Such business information can be highly valuable to 
competitors, as evidenced by the fact that most Freedom of Information Act requests come from 
08__CONRAD.DOC 10/4/2006  9:06 AM 
Summer 2006] OPEN SECRETS 147 
even this information must—not may—be disclosed by the agency “if necessary 
to protect health or the environment against an unreasonable risk of injury.”29 
As exemplified by the DuPont case, TSCA contains civil and criminal 
penalties for violations of its provisions.30  Also, the U.S. criminal code 
establishes substantial penalties for false statements.31 
In summary, TSCA alone assures that a vast universe of chemical hazard 
information is, or can be required to be, provided to EPA and cannot be kept 
secret for financial reasons. 
2. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)32 
Pesticides are regulated under FIFRA.33  Any potential pesticide chemical 
must undergo more than one hundred scientific tests addressing chemistry, 
health effects, environmental effects, and residue chemistry to determine 
whether it can be used safely.34  Only after the information has undergone a 
thorough and rigorous review by EPA can the product be “registered” by EPA 
for use to protect crops or public health.35  According to an industry trade 
association, on average, only one in 139,000 potential pesticide products ever 
makes it from discovery to eventual commercial use.36  Registered pesticides 
have to be reregistered unless EPA concludes that no outstanding data 
requirements remain and the pesticide meets all registration requirements.37 
FIFRA requirements regarding the conduct of testing, the reportability of 
adverse effect data, and the public availability of test and other risk-related 
data, generally track those of TSCA: 
(1) Pesticide tests must use EPA-approved test protocols and follow 
GLP Standards.38 
 
businesses or agents for undisclosed companies.  See Heritage Foundation Center for Media & Public 
Policy, Special Report: Few Journalists Use the Federal Freedom of Information Act, 
http://www.heritage.org/Press/MediaCenter/FOIA.cfm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005) (reporting a study of 
such requests during the first half of 2001).  See also discussion infra Part III.4. 
 29. 15 U.S.C § 2613(a)(3) (2000). 
 30. Id. §§ 2615(a)–(b).  See supra notes 22, 24 (discussing the civil and criminal aspects of the 
DuPont case). 
 31. See the False Identification Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2004) (allowing for fines 
and imprisonment up to five years for intentional fraud or misrepresentation). 
 32. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2000). 
 33. See id. 
 34. See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Pesticides: Regulating Pesticides, 
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/regulating/index.htm (last visited on Apr. 17, 2006) (describing EPA 
pesticide regulation).  The regulatory tests are described in greater detail at U.S. Envtl. Protection 
Agency, Pesticides: Regulating Pesticides Data Requirements, http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/ 
regulating/data.htm (last visited on Apr. 17, 2006). 
 35. 7 U.S.C. § 136a (2000). 
 36. See Crop Life America, Learn More About. . . Pesticide Regulation, 
http://www.croplifeamerica.org/learn_more/pesticide_reg.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2006) (summarizing 
briefly pesticide regulation). 
 37. 7 U.S.C. § 136a-1(a) (2000). 
 38. See 40 C.F.R. § 160.120 (2004) (setting forth GLP Standards).  See also discussion supra Part 
II.A.1. 
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(2) FIFRA Section 6(a)(2) requires pesticide registrants to submit to 
EPA any “factual information regarding unreasonable adverse 
effects on the environment of the pesticide.”39  “Environment” 
includes humans.40 
(3) FIFRA requires EPA to make publicly available, notwithstanding 
any claim of business confidentiality, 
the objectives, methodology, results, or significance of any test or experiment 
performed on or with a registered or previously registered pesticide or its separate 
ingredients, impurities, or degradation products, and any information concerning the 
effects of such pesticide on any organism or the behavior of such pesticide in the 
environment, including, but not limited to, data on safety to fish and wildlife, humans 
and other mammals, plants, animals, and soil, and studies on persistence, translocation 
and fate in the environment . . . .41 
Under FIFRA, confidential information regarding “manufacturing or quality 
control processes” and certain information regarding inert pesticide ingredients 
can be released if EPA (or a court) determines that “disclosure is necessary to 
protect against an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.”42  
Confidential information regarding “production, distribution, sale or 
inventories of a pesticide” can be released if EPA (or a court) determines that, 
on balance, such disclosure is “necessary in the public interest” in connection 
with a public proceeding to determine whether a pesticide or one of its 
ingredients causes “unreasonable adverse effects.”43  Thus, as with chemicals 
generally, information about pesticide hazards generally is publicly available 
without regard to its financial consequences for the registrant.44 
3. Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) 
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Hazard 
Communication Standard, a chemical manufacturer or importer is required to 
develop (or obtain) an MSDS for each hazardous chemical it produces or 
imports.45  MSDSs must be provided to distributors of such hazardous chemicals 
and to employers whenever those chemicals are used in the workplace; 
 
 39. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(a)(2) (2000) (requiring submission of such adverse effects information “at any 
time” after the pesticide is registered).  EPA has issued a class determination under the Freedom of 
Information Act that adverse effects information is categorically not protected as confidential business 
information.  See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Notice: Disclosure of Information Obtained 
Regarding Unreasonable Adverse Effects of Pesticides on the Environment; Class Determination, 64 
Fed. Reg. 70019 (Dec. 1, 1999) (denying confidentiality to safety and efficacy information both 
currently in EPA possession or later acquired). 
 40. 7 U.S.C. § 136(j) (2000).  “Environment” is defined to include “water, air, land, and all plants 
and man and other animals living therein, and the interrelationships which exist among these.”  Id. 
 41. Id. § 136h(d)(1). 
 42. Id. § 136h(d)(1)–(d)(3). 
 43. Id. § 136h(d)(2)–(d)(3). 
 44. Under FIFRA Section 3(c)(1)(F), prospective registrants relying on another registrant’s data 
may be required to pay the original registrant to use that data.  See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(F) (“The 
terms and amount of compensation may be fixed by agreement . . . [or] binding arbitration . . . “). 
 45. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(g)(1) (2003). 
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employers in turn must make MSDSs readily available to workers.46  An MSDS 
must identify the chemical and its hazardous ingredients (if it is a mixture) and 
must also list, among other things, the following: 
(1) Physical and chemical characteristics (for example, flash point), 
(2) Physical hazards (for example, potential for fire, explosion, and 
reactivity), 
(3) Health hazards (“including signs and symptoms of exposure, and any 
medical conditions . . . generally recognized as being aggravated by 
exposure to the chemical”), 
(4) Recognized or recommended exposure limits, and 
(5) Whether the hazardous chemical may cause cancer in the view of 
certain organizations.47 
The MSDS must “accurately [reflect] the scientific evidence used in making the 
hazard determination,” and the preparer must revise it within three months of 
becoming aware of “any significant new information regarding the hazards of a 
chemical, or ways to protect against the hazards.”  MSDSs must be made 
readily available to OSHA and relevant unions upon request.48 
Under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(EPCRA), every workplace that maintains one or more MSDSs for a chemical 
present on-site in an amount above a certain threshold (generally ten thousand  
pounds) must supply copies or a list of MSDSs  to the State Emergency 
Response Commission, the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), and 
the local fire department.49  LEPCs must in turn make these MSDSs available to 
the public upon request.50 
The only information that can be withheld from an MSDS on the basis of 
trade secrecy is the specific chemical identity, and even then, only when the 
properties and effects of the hazardous chemical are disclosed and the specific 
chemical identity is made available to health professionals, employees, and 
relevant unions pursuant to procedures and conditions spelled out in the OSHA 
rules.51 
4. Limitations Imposed by Other Environmental Laws on the Ability to 
Claim Risk Information as Confidential 
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) allows federal agencies to 
withhold from public disclosure “trade secrets and commercial or financial 
 
 46. Id. § 1910.1200(b). 
 47. See the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11021(a) (2000) 
(setting forth the basic requirements for submitting MSDSs or lists); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(g) 
(detailing the contents of an MSDS). 
 48. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(g)(11). 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 11021(a)(1); 40 C.F.R. § 370.21 (2004).  See generally 40 C.F.R. § 370.20 (2004) 
(discussing various threshold requirements triggering the obligation to make an MSDS available to 
certain parties). 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 11021(c)(2). 
 51. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.1200(g)(i), 1200(i). 
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information [that is] privileged or confidential,”52 customarily referred to as 
“confidential business information” or “CBI.”  The Trade Secrets Act makes 
disclosure of “trade secrets”—interpreted by courts to be coextensive with the 
CBI protected by FOIA—a crime.53  As noted above, although both TSCA and 
FIFRA provide for the protection of CBI, they generally do not allow CBI 
claims to be made regarding health or environmental hazard data.54  Most other 
environmental statutes require all records, reports, and other information 
obtained by EPA in the course of implementing the laws to be made publicly 
available unless the information is covered by the Trade Secrets Act,55 and 
several exclude important risk data from trade-secret coverage.  For example, 
(1) EPCRA protects only specific chemical identities, so long as several 
restrictive conditions can be met; even then, however, information 
regarding the adverse effects of such chemicals must be made 
available to any person requesting that information.56 
(2) The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act, or “Superfund,” requires the release of names of 
chemical substances, their physical properties, and hazards posed to 
health and the environment, “including physical hazards (such as an 
explosion) and potential acute and chronic health hazards,” 
potential routes of human exposure, and monitoring data pertaining 
to disposal activities.57 
(3) The Clean Air Act requires “emission data” to be made public.58 
(4) The Clean Water Act requires “effluent data” to be made public.59 
 
 52. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2000). 
 53. See 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2000) (regarding disclosure of confidential information).  See also 
generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY, FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ACT GUIDE (May 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foi-act.htm (discussing cases and 
Department of Justice policy on coextensive definitions of trade secrets). 
 54. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.b, Part II.A.2. 
 55. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1318(b) (2000); Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6927(b)(1) (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c) (2000); Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(7)(2000); Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11042(f) (2000). 
 56. 42 U.S.C. § 11042(a), 11042(h) (2000).  For example, information claimed as a “trade secret” 
must meet four factors, including chemical identity not being “readily discoverable through reverse 
engineering.”  Id. at § 11042(b)(4). 
 57. Id. § 9604(e)(7)(F). 
 58. Id. § 7414(c).  EPA rules define “emission data” to include “[i]nformation necessary to 
determine the identity, amount, frequency, concentration, or other characteristics (to the extent related 
to air quality) of any emission which has been emitted by the source . . . .”  40 C.F.R. § 
2.301(a)(2)(i)(A) (2004). 
 59. 33 U.S.C. § 1318(b) (2000).  EPA rules define “effluent data” to include “[i]nformation 
necessary to determine the identity, amount, frequency, concentration, temperature, or other 
characteristics (to the extent related to water quality) of any pollutant which has been discharged by 
the source . . . .”  40 C.F.R. § 2.302(a)(2)(i)(A) (2004). 
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5. Securities Laws 
A public company’s possession or control of health or safety risk 
information that could cause financial harm to the company if disclosed could 
well be reportable under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
Regulation S-K, requiring disclosure of “known trends or uncertainties that 
have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material . . . 
unfavorable impact” on company operations.60  The requirements of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act that corporate chief executive officers and chief financial 
officers certify the completeness of company financial reports filed with the 
SEC,61 and the significant criminal penalties for false certifications,62 further 
reduce the chance that senior management would accede to the suppression of 
such information. 
B. Legal Disincentives to Concealment 
All the foregoing legal authorities that require disclosure of health and 
safety information to an agency or the public also function to discourage 
nondisclosure because of the potential for civil or criminal liability for 
noncompliance.  Several other federal laws also serve as a substantial 
disincentive to concealing such information, as does state tort law. 
1. Whistleblower Protections 
Virtually all major federal environmental statutes contain “employee 
protection” provisions that prevent a private employer from firing or otherwise 
discriminating against an employee in retaliation for whistleblower actions.63  In 
general, these protected actions include commencing, testifying in, or 
“assist[ing] or participat[ing] . . . in any manner,” in an enforcement action “or 
any other action to carry out the purposes of” the law—or being about to do 
any of these things.64  Beyond reinstatement and back pay, remedies available in 
whistleblower proceedings (conducted by the Secretary of Labor) typically 
include compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees.65  Thus, employees are 
federally protected if they blow the whistle on a company that has violated a 
law by not reporting chemical risk information.  Perhaps more importantly, 
company managers thinking of not disclosing such information would have to 
be concerned that a disgruntled employee who believes he or she might be fired 
or disciplined for some unrelated matter may decide to reveal their 
 
 60. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2005). 
 61. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1350(a), (b) (2000). 
 62. Id. § 1350(c).  Penalties for willful violation can reach a maximum of $5,000,000 and 
imprisonment for twenty years, or both.  Id. 
 63. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000); Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971(a) (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a) (2000); Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9610(a) (2000). 
 64. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a) (2000). 
 65. Id. § 7622(b). 
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nondisclosure as a means of turning the tables on the employer under these 
provisions. 
2. The False Claims Act (FCA)66 
The FCA establishes a qui tam or bounty-hunter incentive for plaintiffs to 
sue over risk information allegedly concealed from the U.S. government.67  
Dating back to the Civil War, and originally enacted to help assure the honesty 
of the federal procurement system, the law enables private citizens, called 
“relators,” to sue, on behalf of the federal government, anyone who the relator 
believes has made a false claim for payment to the United States, for civil 
penalties and treble damages.68  The United States can intervene and take over 
the litigation; otherwise, the private party can pursue the suit.69  In any event, if 
successful, the relator is entitled to between ten and thirty percent of the 
amount the defendant is ordered to pay, based on judicial discretion, plus 
reasonable expenses, attorneys’ fees, and costs.70  The FCA also allows for so-
called “reverse false claims” actions, premised on the notion that the defendant 
has used a false statement or record to avoid liability to the government.71  
Enterprising plaintiffs have argued that the failure to report required 
information to the government—such as a release of a toxic substance—
constitutes a reverse false claim because it allows the defendant to avoid paying 
a penalty for noncompliance.72  Although this approach does not always 
succeed, some precedent supports it.73  The FCA is thus one more reason for 
businesses to be chary about not disclosing information that could reveal a 
violation of law, or where failure to disclose might itself be illegal. 
3. The Effect of Potential Civil Liability 
Finally, state tort law provides powerful incentives for a company to take action 
once it possesses information that its products or operations may pose 
significant risks to others or to the environment.  The precise standards differ 
from state to state, but as a general rule, if a company is aware of such 
information and does not take reasonable steps to reduce those risks, it could 
face very significant liability for negligence if a plaintiff were harmed as the 
 
 66. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2000). 
 67. Id. § 3730(d). 
 68. Id. § 3730(b). 
 69. Id. § 3730(b)(4). 
 70. Id. § 3730(d)(2). 
 71. Id. § 3729(a)(7) (establishing liability for one who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be 
made or used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit 
money or property to the Government”). 
 72. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bain v. Georgia Gulf Corp., 386 F.3d 648, 657–58 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(reversing and remanding the denial of a motion to dismiss for the relator’s failure to state a cognizable 
claim; no relationship, economic or otherwise, existed between the government and defendant that 
would give rise to a financial transfer or payment upon which to base a reverse false claim). 
 73. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Oxnard Lemon Co., 1992 WL 795477, at 
7–11 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 1992) (unreported opinion) (denying motion to dismiss reverse false claim). 
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proximate result of that failure to act.74  Alternatively, or in addition, if such a 
company did not alert foreseeable victims to those risks, and a warning would 
have prevented such persons from being harmed, the company could be liable 
for negligent failure to warn if those persons were in fact harmed.75  Liability 
either for negligence or negligent failure to warn could be heightened by 
documents tending to show that the company was aware of its duties but did not 
take action required by them. 
Any well-advised company will be aware of these duties and would not be 
likely to actively suppress significant risk information.  Although some 
businesses in prior decades may have thought it economically wise to conceal 
clear hazards, the experiences of the tobacco and asbestos industries today 
serve as a sobering warning.  In fact, the duty of due care and the duty to warn, 
as well as the prospect of strict products liability,76 provide incentives not only to 
act on risk information, but to affirmatively design products and services to 
minimize or avoid such risks in the first place.  Risk evaluation is not only, or 
even mostly, a retrospective activity among responsible companies.  Indeed, 
among members of the American Chemistry Council, one of the ten Guiding 
Principles of the Council’s Responsible Care® Management System, which is 
binding on members, is “[t]o make health, safety, the environment and resource 
conservation critical considerations for all new and existing products and 
processes.”77 
C. The Chemical Industry Voluntarily Publishes Enormous Amounts of Risk 
Information 
Chemical safety investigations are routine for chemical manufacturers, so 
large amounts of information on those chemicals in commerce exist in company 
files.  Because adverse effects information must be submitted under section 8 of 
TSCA, industry “private” data is generally thought to show a lack of adverse 
effects.  However, that such information exists does not necessarily mean it is in 
the public domain, particularly in a form that is subject to electronic searches.  
Three major chemical industry initiatives, two operating in partnership with 
EPA, are designed to address this shortcoming.  A fourth initiative produces 
other important, publicly available information relevant to assessing the risks of 
chemicals. 
 
 74. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC 
PRINCIPLES) § 7 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) (discussing duty as a qualification for liability for 
negligence). 
 75. See generally id. at § 18 (discussing negligent failure to warn). 
 76. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (1998) (establishing separate 
standards of liability for manufacturing defects, design defects, and defects based on inadequate 
instructions or warnings).  “The rule for manufacturing defects . . . imposes liability whether or not the 
manufacturer’s quality control efforts satisfy standards of reasonableness.”  Id. at § 2 cmt. a. 
 77. American Chemistry Council, Overview: Guiding Principles, http://www.rctoolkit.com/ 
overview_principles.asp (last visited April 13, 2006). Responsible Care® is the chemical industry’s 
global initiative to improve health, safety, environmental, and security performance.  Id. 
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1. High Production Volume (HPV) Challenge Program and Extended 
HPV Challenge Program 
In 1998, the chemical industry, working with EPA, the Environmental 
Defense Fund (now known as Environmental Defense) and other 
organizations, developed the HPV Challenge Program, an unprecedented 
voluntary initiative with a goal of making uniform health and environmental 
screening information on HPV chemicals publicly available by the end of 2005.78  
Collectively, HPV chemicals, defined by EPA as those produced or imported in 
the United States in quantities greater than one million pounds annually,79 
represent more than ninety percent of current U.S. chemical production and use 
by volume.80 
Through the HPV Challenge Program, more than four hundred sponsoring 
manufacturers have volunteered to provide hazard-screening information for 
approximately 2200 HPV chemicals.81  Sponsoring manufacturers commit to 
providing complete Screening Information Data Sets (SIDS) for one or more 
chemicals.82  The SIDS standards were established in 1987 by the thirty nations 
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development to secure 
uniform sets of hazard-screening information on HPV chemicals worldwide.83  
The standards comprise a series of data sets, tests, testing protocols, and 
information formats for conducting basic hazard assessments of HPV chemicals, 
and cover seventeen endpoints in four categories: (1) physical and chemical 
 
 78. See Letter from Carol M. Browner, Former Administrator, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, to 
Manufacturers/Importers (Oct. 9, 1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/chemrtk/ceoltr1.htm 
(announcing the launch of the HPV Challenge Program in correspondence to the chief executive 
officers of more than 900 chemical companies); see also U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, High 
Production Volume (HPV) Challenge Program, available at http://www.epa.gov/chemrtk/volchall.htm 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2006) (providing information about the program, chemicals, and program 
participants); see generally EPA OVERVIEW, supra note 7, at 31–34 (describing the HPV Challenge 
Program).  The HPV Challenge Program grew out of an Environmental Defense Fund report and 
similar evaluations asserting a lack of publicly available hazard information for various subsets of HPV 
chemicals.  See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, 
Chemical Hazard Data Availability Study: What Do We Really Know About the Safety of High 
Production Volume Chemicals? (Apr. 1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/chemrtk/hazchem.pdf 
(“EPA’s 1998 Baseline of Hazard Information that is Readily Available to the Public”).  All of these 
evaluations were limited to publicly available, electronically searchable information sources, and only 
identified chemical-specific studies, rather than all relevant information.  These limitations resulted in a 
profound underestimation of the available information. 
 79. EPA OVERVIEW, supra note 7, at 32. 
 80. News Release, Chemical and Consumer Product Makers Promise More Public Information on 
Chemical Safety 1 (Mar. 15, 2005), http://www.americanchemistry.com/s_acc/bin.asp?CID=206& 
DID=829&DOC=FILE.PDF (announcing the start of the Extended HPV Program and summarizing 
the impact of the preceding HPV Challenge Program). 
 81. Id. at 1–2. 
 82. See generally U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, 
Guidance for Meeting the SIDS Requirements (Nov. 3, 1998), http://www.epa.gov/chemrtk/ 
sidsappb.pdf [hereinafter EPA Guidance for Meeting the SIDS Requirements]. 
 83. See generally Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Description of 
OECD Work on Investigation of High Production Volume Chemicals, http://www.oecd.org/document/ 
21/0,2340,en_2649_34379_1939669_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2006) (describing how SIDS fit 
within international investigation of HPV chemicals). 
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properties, (2) ecological toxicity, (3) environmental fate, and (4) human 
toxicity.84  In the minority of cases in which data did not already exist to 
complete a data set, test plans to develop that data were developed and have 
been posted for public comment on the EPA Home Page.85  So far, data sets 
have been submitted for more than 2200 chemicals: 1371 via the U.S. HPV 
Challenge Program, which will conclude in 2005, and roughly 851 via its 
international counterpart, operating on a longer time horizon.86  All HPV 
Challenge Program data is publicly available on the EPA Home Page.87 
Earlier this year, the chemical industry announced the Extended HPV 
(EHPV) Program, which broadens the current initiative in two ways.88  First, 
companies are being asked to provide health and environmental information on 
five hundred “new” chemicals that have met the HPV threshold since start of 
the original HPV Challenge Program.89  Second, the EHPV Program increases 
the scope of information being collected for all HPV chemicals to include a 
screening level set of information on use and exposure.90  As with the HPV 
Challenge, all information collected through the EHPV Program will be posted 
on the EPA website by the end of 2010.91 
2. CHEMSTAR® Activities 
For many years, the American Chemistry Council has operated a host of 
self-funded panels and councils composed of chemical industry companies and 
addressing chemical-specific issues that are significant to chemical 
manufacturers and downstream users.92  Scientific research is a substantial focus 
of these “Chemical Self-funded Technical Advocacy and Research Team” 
(CHEMSTAR®) organizations.  In 2004, CHEMSTAR® panels funded $4.6 
million in research studies.  As a matter of policy, CHEMSTAR® entities make 
 
 84. EPA Guidance for Meeting the SIDS Requirements, supra note 82. 
 85. See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Determining the Adequacy of Data, Appendix C (Feb. 10, 
1999 Draft), http://www.epa.gov/chemrtk/datadfin.htm (explaining test plans in further detail).  The test 
plans are posted at U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Robust Summaries and Test Plans, 
http://www.epa.gov/chemrtk/hpvrstp.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2006). 
 86. News Release, supra note 80, at 2. 
 87. See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Robust Summaries and Test Plans,  
http://www.epa.gov/chemrtk/hpvrstp.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2006) for results for the U.S. HPV 
Challenge Program.  Results from its international counterparts are available at Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Integrated HPV Database, http://cs3-
hq.oecd.org/scripts/hpv/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2006). 
 88. News Release, supra note 80, at 1; see also American Chemistry Council et al., Questions and 
Answers on the Extended HPV Program (Mar. 15, 2005), http://www.americanchemistry.com/s_acc/ 
bin.asp?CID=199&DID=536&DOC=FILE.PDF (explaining the similarities and differences between 
the HPV Challenge Program and its subsequent counterpart). 
 89. News Release, supra note 80, at 1. 
 90. Id. at 4. 
 91. Id. at 2. 
 92. See generally American Chemistry Council Home Page, http://www.americanchemistry.com/ 
s_acc/sec_initiatives.asp?CID=157&DID=202 (last visited Apr. 17, 2006) (stating that seventy-three 
panels and two councils have addressed chemistry- or product-related issues). 
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available to the public and appropriate government agencies validated final 
results of all environmental, health, and safety research that they manage.93 
3. Voluntary Children’s Chemical Evaluation Program (VCCEP) 
In December 2000, EPA announced the VCCEP, designed to help the 
public understand the potential health risks to children associated with certain 
chemical exposures.94  EPA developed a list of twenty-three chemicals that have 
been found in various biomonitoring or environmental databases and asked 
companies that manufacture or import these chemicals to volunteer to sponsor 
their evaluation in the first tier of a pilot of the VCCEP.95  Afterwards, “[t]hirty-
five companies and ten consortia responded and volunteered to sponsor twenty 
chemicals.”96  These companies are collecting or developing health effects and 
exposure information on the chemicals and are preparing both a risk assessment 
and a “data needs assessment.”97  After a “peer consultation” (a review by 
scientific experts in the field), EPA will determine whether higher tier 
information is needed.98  If needed, sponsors will again be asked to volunteer to 
provide it; otherwise, EPA and the sponsors plan to “cooperate to conduct 
appropriate risk communication and, if necessary, risk management.”99  All risk 
assessments and peer consultation documents are publicly available.100 
4. ACC Long-Range Research Initiative 
In 1999, ACC initiated its Long-Range Research Initiative (LRI) to 
generate research focused on the three health and environmental issue areas of 
“highest priority to society and the chemical industry”:101 
(1) improving risk assessment methods, 
(2) identifying vulnerable groups and characterizing factors that may 
place them at greater risk, and 
(3) understanding the fate and transport of chemicals in the 
environment.102 
 
 93. Final reports are sent routinely to eight agencies: the Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease 
Registry, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, EPA, the Food and Drug Administration, the 
National Cancer Institute, the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, the National 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, and OSHA. 
 94. See generally U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Voluntary Children’s Chemical Evaluation 
Program (VCCEP), http://www.epa.gov/chemrtk/vccep (last visited Apr. 13, 2006) (providing program 
overview) [hereinafter VCCEP]. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.  The companies and consortia are listed at U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Who’s 
Participating?, http://www.epa.gov/chemrtk/vccep/whosspon.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2006). 
 97. VCCEP, supra note 94. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, How to Access Assessments/Reports/Decisions, 
http://www.epa.gov/_chemrtk/vccep/access.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2006). 
 101. AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, LONG-RANGE RESEARCH INITIATIVE 2004 ANNUAL 
REPORT, 1 http://www.uslri.org/documents/cat_14/doc_437.pdf, (last visited Apr. 13, 2006) [hereinafter 
LRI ANNUAL REPORT]. See generally American Chemistry Council, Long-Range Research Initiative 
Home Page, http://www.uslri.org (last visited Apr. 13, 2006). 
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Research is supported by grants to the CIIT Centers for Health Research, 
collaborative funding efforts with government agencies, and competitive grants 
issued to other organizations and academic institutions through a peer-reviewed 
“Request for Proposal” process.103  Through 2004, approximately $128 million 
had been awarded in support of 164 research projects, ninety-nine of which had 
been completed.104 
The LRI consciously operates to maximize researcher independence and 
scientific openness.  By contract, LRI-funded investigators own and retain 
intellectual property rights in the data they generate.105  The LRI program has 
no approval authority over publications.106  Investigators are strongly 
encouraged to publish their work in the peer-reviewed literature.107  If they do 
not, the LRI reserves the right to make the final report public.108  Through 2004, 
LRI-funded research had generated a total of 335 peer-reviewed articles and 
102 other scientific publications such as books, final reports, and newsletter 
articles, with fifty-six peer-reviewed articles published in 2004.109  In addition, 
1121 presentations on this research have been made over the course of the first 
six years of the LRI program, with 132 presentations in 2004.110 
III 
INCENTIVES ARE EVERYWHERE 
The organizers of this symposium highlighted the economic incentives that 
manufacturers and other for-profit entities have not to disclose scientific 
information that shows their products or operations to be risky.  But as shown 
above, acting upon such incentives is broadly illegal, and substantial, 
countervailing incentives operate against them.  Moreover, for-profit businesses 
are not the only entities affected by incentives to manipulate or conceal 
information.  As emphasized in the recent bestseller Freakonomics,111 all actors 
are affected by incentives that tend to shape behavior.  This principle holds true 
in the area of scientific research as well. 
To be clear, this article does not assert that particular scientific research is 
invalid because of the source of its funding or the motivation of the 
 
 102. LRI ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 101, at 7. 
 103. Id. at 1. 
 104. Id. 
 105. American Chemistry Council, Long-Range Research Initiative Home Page, Funding 
Opportunities, http://www.uslri.org/home.cfm?id=funding (last visited Apr. 13, 2006). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. LRI ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 101, at 32. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Steven D. Levitt & Stephen J. Dubner, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST EXPLORES 
THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 13 (2005) (“Incentives are the cornerstone of modern life.  And 
understanding them—or, often, ferreting them out—is the key to solving just about any riddle, from 
violent crime to sports cheating to online dating.”) (emphasis in original). 
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experimenter.  Rather, the point is only that everyone faces potentially multiple 
incentives regarding disclosure, most of which are directly or indirectly 
financial.  Besides affecting for-profit businesses, these incentives can also affect 
whether, when, and how governmental or nonprofit entities—or scientists 
funded by them—disclose data they generate, or challenge data others 
generate. 
Most simply, but perhaps most importantly, all researchers face endemic 
questions about guarding the results of their work to ensure they are the first to 
publish the results.  This dynamic affects not only whether and how much of 
their data and methods to disclose in the initial publication, but how much to 
maintain confidential thereafter so as to enable additional publications based 
on the same data set.  Recently, the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute 
(NHLBI) refused to release data from a study it funded on the effects of dietary 
salt on blood pressure.  Even as the NHLBI was issuing press releases and other 
recommendations trumpeting the results of the study, it did not release 
underlying data and methods—until the Salt Institute and the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce filed a lawsuit to compel its release.112  It is unclear why the agency 
was initially unwilling to release the data, but one possible answer is that the 
researchers were waiting for publication of a journal article based on the data, 
which appeared shortly before the government filed its reply brief in support of 
its motion to dismiss.113  Credentials based on first publication and volume of 
publications are key to career advancement in academia, but they are important 
in the career of any scientist, regardless of where he or she is employed.  
Because the credential incentive is so widespread and fundamental, it poses a 
profound and difficult question for the academic and scientific communities, 
one that warrants inclusion in any assessment of scientific sequestration. 
Economic as well as credential incentives affect a researcher’s interest in 
sharing unpublished data.  All scientific researchers without unlimited personal 
wealth need funding to conduct research and will therefore inevitably be 
conscious of where the next grant or contract is coming from.  Thus, even 
academic researchers are likely at least to think about the effect on their current 
or future sources of funding when determining whether, when, and how to 
disclose their results and the data underlying them. 
 
 112. Salt Inst. v. Thompson, 345 F. Supp. 2d 589, 592–93, 603 (E.D. Va. 2004) (granting motion to 
dismiss claims, inter alia, for lack of standing), appeal docketed, No. 05-1097 (4th Cir. Jan. 25, 2005).  
The NHLBI is part of the Department of Health and Human Services.  Id.  This research was funded 
before the effective date (April 17, 2000) of the so-called “Shelby Amendment,” which requires 
government agencies to publicly disclose the results of federally funded research, subject to personal 
privacy protections.  Id. at 595.  For the text of the Shelby Amendment, see Omnibus Consolidated and 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681.  The two-
sentence Shelby Amendment required the Office of Management and Budget to revise its Circular A-
110 to ensure that all data from federally funded research be made publicly available pursuant to the 
Freedom of Information Act.  Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Agreements with 
Institutions of Higher Education, Hospitals and Other Non-Profit Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 14406 
(Mar. 16, 2000) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 3019). 
 113. See Thompson, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 597–98. 
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Economic incentives affect the behavior of nonprofit professional 
associations, as well. The American Chemical Society (ACS)114 recently secured 
congressional assistance in protecting its fee-based Chemical Abstracts Service 
(CAS) Registry—historically the reference database for information on the 
structure and property of chemicals—from possible competition by 
“PubChem,” a free database operated by the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH).115  ACS is understandably concerned that PubChem may—at taxpayer 
expense—replicate portions of the CAS generated at substantial expense by 
ACS, this example confirms that economic incentives can lead even nonprofit 
professional associations to take actions at least facially inconsistent with “free” 
science.116 
Mission-oriented entities such as regulatory agencies and nongovernmental 
advocacy organizations are subject to programmatic, as well as financial, 
incentives that inescapably color whether, when, and how to disclose or 
characterize scientific research results.  On the financial side, the size of a 
regulatory agency’s budget is generally proportional to the perceived size of the 
problems it is attempting to address.  Looking beyond financial incentives, in 
the case of environmental hazards, the relevant federal statutes are generally 
oriented toward restrictive or negative goals—identification of toxic or 
hazardous substances, prevention of harm, and forcing technology beyond its 
current capabilities.117  Most statutes administered by EPA do not embody a 
competing, positive statutory impetus to allow any particular substance or 
activity (unlike the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, for example), or to promote 
a sector of the economy or employment.118  Institutional dynamics operating 
upon and within agencies not surprisingly push the same way.  Therefore, 
agencies are hailed for banning or restricting bad substances, but criticized if 
 
 114. The American Chemical Society is unrelated to the American Chemistry Council. 
 115. See Susan R. Morrissey, NIH and ACS Spar over PubChem: Agency’s New Chemical Database 
Draws Concern From ACS for Similarities to CAS Registry, 83 CHEM. & ENGINEERING NEWS 23–25 
(2005) (discussing the creation, content, and scope of the private CAS Registry and “unfair 
competition” arguments against the government-sponsored rival database, PubChem).  The free 
PubChem database is available at National Center for Biotechnology Information, PubChem Text 
Search, http://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov (last visited Apr. 13, 2006).  The CAS Registry is accessible on 
a fee basis through SciFinder, Product Overview, http://www.cas.org/SCIFINDER (last visited Apr. 13, 
2006). 
 116. The House Appropriations Committee report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2006 spending bill 
for NIH “urges NIH to work with private sector providers to avoid unnecessary duplication and 
competition with private sector databases.”  See H.R. REP. NO. 109-143, at 112 (2005). 
 117. For example, the Clean Water Act directs EPA to identify “toxic” water pollutants, 33 U.S.C. § 
1317(a)(1) (2000), to set effluent limitations for such pollutants that reflect “the best available 
technology economically achievable” for new sources discharging them, id. § 1317(a)(2), and to 
determine that such limitations provide “an ample margin of safety,” id. § 1317(a)(4). 
 118. Again, for example, the goals and policy of the Clean Water Act are expressed entirely in terms 
of “eliminat[ing]” and “prohibit[ing]” discharges of pollutants.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).  FIFRA is a 
rare, partial counterexample in that it requires EPA, when deciding whether to “register” a pesticide, 
to consider “the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits” of its use.  See 7 U.S.C. § 
136a(a) (2000) (pesticide registrations are to include any limits needed to prevent “unreasonable 
adverse effects on the environment”; costs and benefits of pesticide use are relevant to determining 
such effects). 
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they fail to do so and allow one to enter the marketplace.  Few cheer if a 
substance is reviewed, found to be safe, and left in commerce. 
Commentators have noted how these dynamics can affect scientists 
employed or funded by agencies:  “[I]t might be thought that that scientists 
employed or funded by an agency could feel pressured to support what they 
perceive to be the agency’s regulatory position, first in developing the science, 
and then in peer reviewing it.”119  “[M]ost money, even so-called government 
money, comes with some strings related to expected results.”120  Some 
government agencies have refused to release critical data underlying their 
conclusions, generating significant controversies.  A prime example is the 
Harvard “Six Cities” study that was the principal basis for the EPA “PM-2.5” 
rule regarding particulate air emissions.121  EPA’s nondisclosure ultimately led 
Congress to enact the “Shelby Amendment,” requiring all federally funded 
researchers to provide the funding agency with all information generated by the 
research so that it can be subject to FOIA.122  As noted earlier, the NHLBI also 
refused, until it was sued, to release data from a salt study it had funded.123 
In the case of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), incentives are even 
more obvious.  From the financial perspective, it is intuitive that fundraising 
appeals become more compelling as the evils they seek to combat increase.  
More programmatically, an NGO dedicated to advocacy faces all the same 
incentives as any other advocate in a controversy, and these incentives are 
bound to influence how NGOs present and characterize data.  For example, 
Ralph Nader, the founder of Public Citizen, which advocated for mandatory air 
bags, trumpeted the virtues of air bags and derided the value of mandatory seat 
belt laws in the 1970s and 1980s.124  Evidence now shows that mandatory seat 
belt laws are far more effective at saving lives than air bags and that air bags can 
actually pose significant risks.125  During the same timeframe, auto companies 
 
 119. Office of Management and Budget, Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information 
Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023, 54,024 (Sept. 15, 2003). 
 120. Robert W. Hahn, Disclosing Conflicts of Interest: Some Personal Reflections 8 n.25 (AEI-
Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper 02–2, 2002). 
 121. See C. Arden Pope, III et al., Particulate Air Pollution as a Predictor of Mortality in a 
Prospective Study of U.S. Adults, 151 AM. J. RESPIR. CRIT. CARE MED, 669 (1995).  This study, which 
concluded that very small particles less than or equal to 2.5 microns were associated with significant 
public mortality, was influential in leading EPA to revise its national ambient air quality standards to 
include stringent limits on such particles.  See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate 
Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652-01, 38655 n.7 (July 17, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50) (providing 
final PM-2.5 rule, citing Pope study). 
 122. See supra note 112. 
 123. See supra notes 112–113  and accompanying text. 
 124. Malcolm Gladwell, Wrong Turn; How the Fight to Make America’s Highways Safer Went Off 
Course, THE NEW YORKER, June 11, 2001, at 50, 56 (Ralph Nader was one of several high-profile 
advocates “consumed by the battle to force a reluctant Detroit to make the air bag mandatory 
equipment”).  These advocates thought air bags would be more effective than seatbelts because air 
bags require no human action to work.  Id. 
 125. See generally id. at 58–61.  “[T]oday it is seatbelts, not air bags, that are providing the most 
important new safety advancements.”  Id. at 58.  A seatbelt alone cuts the chance of dying in an 
accident by forty-three percent, while an air bag alone only does so by thirteen percent.  Id. 
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predicted that air bags would kill some number of children and small adults and 
raised these concerns with the National Highway Traffic and Safety 
Administration (NHTSA).126  Joan Claybrook of Public Citizen, however, called 
their data “a little poop sheet,” and other “safety advocates” dismissed it as 
“manufactured” data.127  Subsequently, the auto manufacturers’ predictions 
turned out to be correct.128 
As with industry-funded scientists, scientists allied with “public interest” 
groups have also been faulted for not disclosing the data on which they rely.129  
Such scientists have not been above outright falsification, as occurred with a 
widely publicized study that purported to show synergistic effects from 
pesticides; unfortunately, the falsification did not become known until after the 
study had played a major role in the enactment of the Food Quality Protection 
Act.130 
 It is important to consider not only incentives for nondisclosure, but a range 
of other issues that could compromise the validity of what actually is disclosed, 
such as 
(1) drawing firm conclusions from novel results that have not been 
replicated, 
(2) making claims that data cannot support (due to sample size, etc.), 
(3) over-interpreting data, 
(4) editing data, and 
(5) falsification. 
In fact, a recent commentary published in Nature provides empirical—and 
conservative—data that these kinds of problems are relatively widespread.  The 
article, summarizing survey responses from 3247 scientists, found that while 
 
 126. See David B. Ottaway & Warren Brown, From Life Saver to Fatal Threat: How the U.S., 
Automakers and a Safety Device Failed, WASH. POST, June 1, 1997, at A01 (explaining that the federal 
government was expected to give drivers the option of deactivating air bags).  NHTSA ultimately 
decided that persons within four “risk groups” can have their air bags turned off after securing approval 
from NHTSA.  See 49 C.F.R § 595.5 (2005) (setting forth requirements to have air bags turned off). 
 127. Ottaway & Brown, supra note 126.  Claybrook became head of NHTSA in 1977 and went on to 
run Public Citizen in 1980.  Gladwell, supra note 124, at 58–60. 
 128. Ottaway & Brown, supra note 126. 
 129. See NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, REPORT OF THE ENDOCRINE DISRUPTORS LOW-
DOSE PEER REVIEW, iv, 1–4 to 1–5 (August 2001), http://ntp-server.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/htdocs/ 
liason/LowDosePeerFinalRpt.pdf (mouse colony in which low-dose endocrine effects—not reproduced 
elsewhere—were observed by Frederick vom Saal “is no longer available”; raw data supporting his oral 
presentation and two other papers was not provided to peer reviewers).  Vom Saal is associated with 
non-governmental organizations supporting the notion that very low doses of some chemicals can cause 
adverse effects on the endocrine systems of organisms.  See, e.g., Greenpeace Int’l, Poisoning the 
Future: Impacts of Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals on Wildlife and Human Health (Oct. 1997), 
http://archive.greenpeace.org/toxics/reports/ptf/ptf.html (citing multiple papers authored or coauthored 
by Vom Saal). 
 130. See John A. McLachlan, Synergistic Effect of Environmental Estrogens: Report Withdrawn, 227 
SCIENCE 462, 462–63 (1997) (withdrawing earlier report on behalf of the author and coauthor Steven F. 
Arnold).  See also Case Summaries, NEWSLETTERS, (U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services Office 
of Research Integrity), Dec. 2001, http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps17396/ori.dhhs.gov/html/ 
publications/newsletters_vol10no1.asp.htm#CASE%20SUMMARIES (follow “Case Summaries” 
hyperlink) (detailing Arnold’s admission of scientific misconduct). 
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only three-tenths of one percent had not properly disclosed involvement in 
firms whose products were based on a scientist’s own research, such as 
pharmaceutical companies, over ten percent had withheld the details of a 
methodology or result in a paper or proposal, and six percent had failed to 
present data contradicting the scientist’s own research.131 
In sum, a welter of financial and other incentives affect the disclosure 
practices of all players in the scientific process, particularly as it becomes 
relevant to regulation. 
IV 
PLAINTIFFS’ LAWYERS AND SCIENCE 
Many of the articles in this symposium are principally concerned about the 
distorting influence that money in the hands of businesses can have on science 
and about the financial incentives for businesses to shape or manufacture 
science or to create scientific uncertainty.  Besides manufacturers and users of 
products, the other major for-profit entities with an economic stake in the 
science related to chemical hazards are law firms who represent plaintiffs in 
toxic-tort litigation.  Although the focus of their efforts is courtrooms, scientific 
evidence and methodologies that they promote can affect regulatory 
proceedings as well. 
One of the consequences of the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.132 has been a greater emphasis on publication 
in peer-reviewed journals as an indication of scientific credibility and, hence, 
reliability.  To help win judicial acceptance of their theories and studies, expert 
witnesses working for plaintiffs’ lawyers have increasingly published articles in 
peer-reviewed journals.  In many cases, the work was generated for litigation 
purposes and funded by law firms—but these facts have often not been 
disclosed in the articles.133  Courts have also noted the “apparent obscurity”134 of 
some of the journals that appear repeatedly in litigation and that are edited by 
regular expert witnesses for plaintiffs,135 and have questioned whether they are 
 
 131. Brian Martinson et al., Scientists Behaving Badly, 435 NATURE 737 and Table 1 (2005). 
 132. 509 U.S. 579, 591–97 (1993) (establishing the trial judge as a gatekeeper for gauging the 
reliability of scientific evidence in federal courts).  “The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer 
reviewed journal [is] a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity 
of a particular technique or methodology on which the opinion is premised.”  Id. at 593–94. 
 133. See Anderson et al., supra note 13, at 624–27, 660–62 (discussing, for example, Nat’l Bank of 
Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co., 965 F. Supp. 1490 (E.D. Ark. 1996) and Bourne v. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co., No. 2:97–0090 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 31, 1996)). 
 134. See Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co., 921 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 n.3 (D. Nev. 1996) 
(questioning publication of an article in a journal apparently missing from the comprehensive Index 
Medicus of the National Library of Medicine, but weighing  “apparent obscurity” with other factors in 
deciding the admissibility of plaintiff’s expert testimony based on article). 
 135. For example, the International Journal of Occupational Medicine and Toxicology was relied on 
by plaintiffs in both Valentine, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 670 n.3, and Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 965 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1499.  A second journal, the Archives of Environmental Health, was also relied on by the plaintiff’s 
expert in Nat’l Bank of Commerce.  Id.  Kaye H. Kilburn, who is the president of his own consulting 
and expert firm (Kaye H. Kilburn, Curriculum Vitae, http://www.neuro-test.com/Khk_cv.htm, last 
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in fact “peer reviewed.”136  Although this work is not automatically invalidated 
by its provenance, legitimate concerns can be raised about the reliability of 
research generated by law firms and witnesses with an obvious financial interest 
in the outcome, and about the effectiveness of peer review at some of the 
journals in which this work appears.  Certainly, the failure to fully disclose that 
provenance impairs the practice of open science, whose validity ultimately 
depends on the integrity and authenticity of the scientists, institutions, and 
journals that are its major players.137 
Much concern has been expressed about the independence of scientists who 
are employed or funded by regulated businesses.  Such concern should also 
logically apply to scientists who are paid by plaintiffs’ lawyers to serve as expert 
witnesses, many of whom also participate regularly in regulatory activities.  In 
either case, the economic prospects of the sponsor are more or less dependent 
on decisions by government entities—be they courts or agencies—based on the 
work of the sponsored scientists.  The point is not that scientists receiving funds 
from for-profit entities necessarily have a fatal conflict of interest, much less 
that their work is somehow less valid.  Rather, the potential for conflict, or 
more likely bias, is present in both cases and justifies disclosure in order to 
allow adequate scientific assessment of the work. 
Although much of the focus of the Coronado II papers is on sealing orders 
that prevent the public release of information generated in the course of a 
lawsuit,138 it is important to note that such agreements require the consent not 
only of the defendant but also of the plaintiff.  Thus, plaintiffs’ interests are also 
actively engaged in sequestering science.  Moreover, although an individual 
plaintiff may be concerned only about winning justice for him or herself, the 
plaintiff’s lawyer could well benefit from a sealing order, as the lawyer will 
thereby avoid making it any easier for other lawyers to gain the subject matter 
expertise that the first lawyer has acquired and can use in subsequent cases. 
One can also question—and indeed, someone should study—the degree to 
which, in the course of pretrial and trial proceedings, plaintiffs’ lawyers and 
experts in their employ are disclosing to public health officials the extent of 
occupational or other environmental injuries they assertedly are discovering 
and avenging in their litigation.  In a remarkable opinion spanning over two 
hundred pages, a federal judge took to task the doctors working for the 
plaintiffs’ firms in a lawsuit that involved some nine thousand alleged silicosis 
cases: 
 
visited Apr. 13, 2006), edits the latter journal and authored the relevant article in the former journal, 
whose “apparent obscurity” was noted by the court in Valentine, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 670 n.2, n.3.  See 
supra note 122. 
 136. See Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 965 F. Supp. at 1499. 
 137. Anderson et al., supra note 13, provides a thoughtful and evenhanded analysis of how courts 
should address the challenges posed by “litigation science.” 
 138. E.g., Daniel J. Givelber & Anthony Robbins, Public Health Versus Court-Sponsored Secrecy, 
69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 130 (Summer 2006). 
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And, finally, despite diagnosing a serious and completely preventable disease at 
unprecedented rates, not a single doctor even bothered to lift a telephone and notify 
any governmental agency, union, employer, hospital or even media outlet, all of whom 
conceivably could have taken steps to ensure recognition of currently undiagnosed 
silicosis cases and to prevent future cases from developing.  One can imagine the 
outcry that would have resulted had these doctors kept silent after diagnosing 
thousands of new cases of avian flu or mad-cow disease.139 
The Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy (SKAPP), which 
organized the conference giving rise to this symposium, is itself an indirect 
creation of the trial bar, as it is principally funded by the silicone-gel breast 
implant litigation settlement.140  Indeed, it is not beyond the pale to view the 
overall thrust of work commissioned by SKAPP to date as seeking to tilt the 
balance in litigation and regulation away from science conducted or supported 
by regulated entities and defendants in lawsuits, and toward science conducted 
or supported by plaintiffs.141  This is unfortunate, because the scientific work 
conducted by regulated entities for submission to agencies is generally of the 
highest quality—and often of higher quality than that produced at universities.  
As discussed above, under laws like TSCA and FIFRA, research must use 
agency test protocols, must follow GLP Standards, and is subject to agency 
audit.142  The same frequently cannot be said of other research.143 
Based on the proceedings of the Coronado conferences, the first of which 
had no “counterpoint” papers such as those presented here,144 one is moved to 
question whether the SKAPP agenda is any less self-interested than it claims 
those of “private parties” to be.  Nothing is more “special” about the interests 
of profit-seeking manufacturers or their trade associations than about the 
interests of profit-seeking lawyers or their strategic allies. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Whatever the economic incentives facing businesses that make or use 
chemicals, numerous federal laws require them to make publicly available 
information regarding the health and environmental effects of chemicals.  These 
and other laws also create substantial disincentives to concealment.  Many of 
these businesses are also voluntarily disclosing enormous amounts of such data.  
 
 139. In re Silica Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 1553 (S.D. Tex. June 30, 2005), slip op. at 
149–50, available at http://www.txs.uscourts.gov/notablecases/203md1553/203md1553-1902.pdf.  Of 
course, the judge also indicated her belief that the case involved not “an industrial disaster of 
unprecedented proportion”—20,479 silicosis cases were “identified” in Mississippi in three years, when 
twenty-four would have been expected—“[but] something else entirely.”  Id. at 11–15. 
 140. SKAPP Self-description, supra note 1. 
 141. For example, review the articles from the first SKAPP Coronado Conference, compiled in 
Symposium, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, Supplement 1 (2005) (entitled “Scientific Evidence and Public 
Policy”). 
 142. See supra Part II.A.1, Part II.A.2. 
 143. See Anderson et al., supra note 13, at 632–33, 675. 
 144. The proceedings of the first Coronado conference were published in Symposium, supra note 
140. 
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Moreover, everyone who makes decisions regarding the disclosure of chemical 
effects data is subject to economic and other incentives that may affect whether, 
when, and how to disclose.  Finally, the plaintiffs’ bar and its expert witnesses 
face at least the same economic incentives that regulated businesses face, 
although their scientific work is less often produced under regulatory standards 
for rigor.  Science is not more or less valid because of incentives affecting its 
creators, but those incentives should be identified and disclosed, so that all 
concerned can subject it to the desired degree of scrutiny.  Ultimately, the 
methods and practices of open science—principally peer review, publication 
and replication—best determine the validity of scientific work. 
